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Possession of Narcotic Drugs-Ritter v. Commonwealth
Possession of narcotic drugs, including marijuana, is deemed illegal in
Virginia by statute.' The concept of possession has been a major contro-
versy in criminal proceedings in Virginia and other states. Generally, legal
possession has meant the holding of property in one's own power or com-
mand.2 There may be either an actual physical holding, which consists of
the power to control the property plus the intent to control the property,3
or constructive possession, where there is an absence of actual physical con-
trol, but a capacity to control along with the intent to control such property."
Whether constructive possession of marijuana would be sufficient for
conviction under the Virginia statute was recently considered in Ritter v.
Commonwealth.' The police obtained a warrant to search Ritter's house for
narcotic drugs. After finding no such drugs, they asked Ritter's mother to
check the mailbox.6 In doing so she found a package addressed to her son.
ICh. 451, §§ 1 (14), (19), [1952] Va. Acts of Assembly 737 (repealed 1970); ch. 86,
§ 2, [1934] Va. Acts of Assembly 82 (repealed 1970). Possession of narcotics is now
made illegal by VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.101 (c) (Cum. Supp. 1970).
2See Field Furniture Co. v. Community Loan Co., 257 Ky. 825, 79 S.W.2d 211
(1934); 73 C.J.S. Property § 14(c) (1951); 72 C.J.S. Possession (1951); 1 C.J.S. Actual
(1936); R. BROWN, Tssr LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 19-22 (2d ed. 1936).
3 See People v. Rumley, 100 Cal. App. 2d 6, 222 P.2d 913 (1950); People v. Johnston,
73 Cal. App. 2d 488, 166 P.2d 633 (1946); People v. Bassett, 68 Cal. App. 2d 241,
156 P.2d 457 (1945); 73 C.J.S. Property § 14(c) (1951); 72 C.J.S. Possession (1951);
1 C.J.S. Actual (1936); R. Brown, THE LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 19-22 (2d ed.
1936).
4 See Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306, 311 (9th Cir. 1960); 73 C.J.S. Property
§ 14(c) (1951); 72 C.J.S. Possession (1951); R. Brown, THlE LAw OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY 19-22 (2d ed. 1936).
5 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970).
6 The search warrant used by the officers to investigate the Ritter residence did not
extend to the mailbox where the marijuana was found. However, this fact was not
known by Mrs. Ritter when she was asked by the police to check the mail. Items
seized from an area not covered by a search warrant may only be admissable if consent
for the search is voluntarily given by the resident. The Supreme Court has stated
in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), that such consent will be considered
involuntary if the consenting resident submits to the demands of police officers armed
with a search warrant which is later proven invalid as to the area searched.
Judge Gordon, in his dissent in Ritter, argued that the Bumper rule was not cor-
rectly applied by the majority to the existing factual situation. Judge Gordon believed
that Mrs. Ritter retrieved the mail under the compulsion of what she thought was a
valid search warrant. The majority of the court never really addressed itself to the
voluntariness of Mrs. Ritter's actions, but rather assumed that she acted voluntarily
because she knew the package was in the mailbox and never objected to surrendering
it. Judge Gordon states his position as follows:
Looking in the mailbox was part of an overall search of the premises, ostensibly
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She handed it to the police7 who took it to Ritter and asked him to open it.
He did so, and when questioned as to its contents replied that it was "pot."
When asked if the package was his, Ritter answered, "It must be mine, it's
got my name on it." A search incident to the arrest disclosed a receipt for
a money order, approximately equal to the value of marijuana in the
package, which had been forwarded to the area from which the package
had been mailed. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld Ritter's
conviction stating that the marijuana was not only in his actual dominion
when given to him by the police officers, but also in his constructive pos-
session when it was placed in his mailbox.
Prior to Ritter, Virginia held that criminal control of narcotic drugs had
to be actual and exclusive while constructive possession created only civil
liability.' Also, in order to raise the presumption of guilt, the defendant
made under the authority of a search warrant. And Ritter's mother did not, I
believe, look freely and without compulsion. Rather, I must conclude that
Ritter's mother looked into the mailbox and handed over the package because
she knew that the officers would look and seize what was found, if she did not.
This conclusion, that her actions resulted from coercion, appears dictated by
Bumper v. North Carolina ....
210 Va. at 743, 173 S.E.2d at 807.
7 Ritter also objected to the seizure of the package from the mailbox on the ground
that his mother could not validly consent to the search and seizure of his personal mail.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, however, felt that the seizure was justified under the
holding of Rees v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 127 S2E.2d 406 (1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 964, reb. denied, 373 U.S. 947 (1963). Rees held that the parents of the
defendant could validly consent to the search of their home when their son was only
an occasional guest in the home and the area searched was under the exclusive control
of the parents. Rees does lend subtantial support to the Ritter holding, although it may
be factually distinguished in that Ritter was a high school student living with his
parents, while Rees was an adult, making only occasional visits. Ritter considered his
parents' home to be his place of residence, whereas Rees did not. The Ritter holding
seems, therefore, to extend parents' right to consent to searches of areas of a home
which they jointly occupy with their children.
Federal courts have lent additional support to this aspect of the Ritter decision. See
Woodard v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 930 (1958).
But cf. Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
However, since the Fourteenth Amendment protects people rather than areas, then
it may be questioned how the rights of non-consenting defendant may be waived by
the consent of the owner of the premises. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
353 (1967); United States v. Poole, 307 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (E.D. La. 1969).8 See Henderson v. Commonwealth, 130 Va. 761, 107 S.E. 700 (1921); Tyler v.
Commonwealth, 120 Va. 868, 91 S.E. 171 (1917).
A constructive possession, like constructive notice or knowledge, though
sufficient to create a civil liability, is not sufficient to hold the prisoner to a
criminal charge. He can only be required to account for the [properties] which
he actually and knowingly possessed, as, for example, where they are found
upon his person, or in his private apartment. . . . If they are found upon
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
must have had actual knowledge of the presence and character of the sub-
stance in addition to exclusive and actual custody.9 With the Ritter decision,
Virginia concurs with the majority of jurisdictions which holds that con-
structive possession of a narcotic drug is sufficient evidence for conviction,
providing that knowledge of the existence of narcotics may be inferred from
the defendant's acts, declarations or conduct."
Since the Virginia statute contained a myriad of prohibited acts, the court
as a matter of public policy decided to utilize a broad interpretation as to
what constitutes possession." This expanded interpretation adheres to the
premises owned or occupied as well by others as himself, or in a place to which
others had equal facility and right of access, there seems no good reason why he,
rather than they, should be charged upon this evidence alone. Id. at 871, 91
S.E. at 172.
9 See Henderson v. Commonwealth, 130 Va. 761, 107 S.E. 700 (1921). See generally
Tyler v. Commonwealth, 120 Va. 868, 91 S.E. 171 (1917).
10 See Petley v. United States, 427 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1970) (constructive possession
of marijuana in duffel bag, although bag was in the protective custody of the airline);
United States v. Cepelis, 426 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1970) (one has constructive possession
of narcotics if he knows of its presence and has the power to exercise dominion and
control over it); United States v. Pardo-Bolland, 348 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1965) (constructive possession shown by holding claim check
of baggage containing narcotics); United States v. Landry, 257 F.2d 425 (7th Cir.
1958); State v. Hunt, 91 Ariz. 149, 370 P.2d 642 (1962); Carroll v. State, 90 Ariz. 411,
368 P.2d 649 (1962); People v. Henderson, 121 Cal. App. 2d 816, 264 P.2d 225 (1953);
People v. Gallagher, 12 Cal. App. 2d 434, 55 P.2d 889 (1936); People v. Sinclair,
129 Cal. App. 320, 19 P.2d 23 (1933); People v. Galloway, 28 IMI. 2d 355, 192 N.E.2d
370 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964); People v. Fox, 24 Ill. 2d 581, 182 NE.2d
692 (1962); People v. Embry, 20 Ill. 2d 331, 169 N.E. 2d 767 (1960); People v. Matthews,
18 Ill. 2d 164, 163 N.E.2d 469 (1959); People v. Mack, 12 Ill. 2d 151, 145 N.E.2d 609
(1957); Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A.2d 516 (1964); Armwood v. State, 229 Md.
565, 185 A.2d 357 (1962); Bryant v. State, 229 Md. 531, 185 A.2d 190 (1962); State v.
Worley, 375 S.W. 2d 44 (Mo. 1964); State v. Caffey, 365 S.W. 2d 607 (Mo. 1963);
State v. Edwards, 317 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1958); State v. Reed, 34 N.J. 554, 170 A.2d 419
(1961); State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio App. 124, 165 N.E.2d 814 (1960). See also, Gallegos
v. People, 139 Colo. 166, 337 P.2d 961 (1959); Gonzales v. People, 128 Colo. 522, 264
P.2d 508 (1953); De La Garza v. State, 379 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1964); Massiate v. State,
365 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1963); Watson v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 593, 301 S.W.2d 651
(1957); Cornelius v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 356, 256 S.W.2d 102 (1953) (constructive
possession where custody of the narcotic remains in the agent over whom the defendant
exercises control).
1 1See Brief for Appellee at 15, Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d
799 (1970). See also Robbs v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 153, 176 S.E.2d 429 (1970).
VA. CODa ANN. § 54-488 (1950) states that
[ilt shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his
control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense, or compound any narcotic drug,
except as authorized in this article.
Virginia's § 54-488 is similar to the Michigan statute, § P.A. 1952, no. 266, § 18.1123
Stat. Ann. 1957 Rev. which states: "Any person not having a license ...who shall
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legislative intent of prohibiting the possession of marijuana coupled with
actual or inferred knowledge of the presence of the drug. 2
There is a split of authority as to whether mere possession of marijuana
without knowledge of the character of the drug makes one guilty of an
illegal holding, or if such detention must be accompanied with knowledge
of the presence and the character of the substance. A minority of jurisdic-
tions has held that such knowledge is not essential for conviction." How-
ever, the majority deems knowledge of the character of the drug as well as
knowledge of the presence of the drug to be essential.14 Illinois 5 and Cali-
possess or have under his or her control any naroctic drug shall be deemed guilty of
a felony." Virginia's reasoning was similar to that of Michigan in construing its statute.
The Michigan court stated:
Here, we are construing an act regarding a multitude of activities the legislature
has demonstrated a substantial purpose to -regulate by license or to eliminate by
penal sanctions.... In this act the legislature has spoken in broad, all embracing
proscriptive language forbidding even possession for personal consumption or use.
The court further explained that because possession and control are made separate
offenses under the Michigan stature, then the possession forbidden was not that
possession that is known in the law of property or of torts, which is described in
terms of control.
'These considerations lead us to conclude that the possession of narcotics forbidden
by the Michigan act is broad enough to include narcotics knowingly [in constructive
possessionJ." People v. Harper, 365 Mich. 494, 113 N.W.2d 808, 813-4 (1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 930 (1962).
12 See ch. 451 §§ 1 (14), (19), [1952] Va. Acts of Assembly 737 (repealed 1970);
ch. 86, § 2 [1934] Va. Acts of Assembly 82 (repealed 1970); VA. CoDE ANN.
§ 54-524.101(c) (Cum. Supp. 1970).
13 See Broic v. State, 79 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1955); Jenkins v. State, 215 Md. 70, 137
A.2d 115 (1957) (the state need not prove knowledge or willful intent); Common-
wealth v. Lee, 331 Mass. 166, 117 N.E.2d 830 (1954); State v. Larkins, 3 Wash. App.
203, 473 P.2d 854 (1970); State v. Boggs, 57 Wash. 2d 484, 358 P.2d 124 (1961). But cf.
Armor., 91 A.L.R.2d 810 (1963). There is a conflict as to whether the defendant must
also know the drugs' character as narcotic as well as their presence. Id. at 821.
14 See Mickens v. People, 148 Colo. 237, 365 P.2d 679 (1961); State v. Oliver, 247 La.
729, 174 So. 2d 509 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965); State v. Richard, 245
La. 465, 158 So. 2d 828 (1963); State v. Maney, 242 La. 223, 135 So. 2d 473 (1961);
State v. Nicolosi, 228 La. 65, 81 So 2d 771 (1955) (possession without knowledge is
not possession in the legal sense of the word, and therefore knowledge is an essential
ingredient of illegal possession of narcotics); Overton v. State, 78 Nev. 198, 370 P.2d
677 (1962); Wallace v. State, 77 Nev. 123, 359 P.2d 749 (1961); State v. Giddings,
67 N.M. 87, 352 P.2d 1003 (1960) (actual knowledge of the presence and character
of narcotics is essential and the state must prove such knowledge on the part of the
defendant); Gonzales v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 8, 246 S.W.2d 199 (1951).
15The defendant's knowledge of the narcotic substance may be inferred from his
acts, declarations, or conduct. See, People v. Pigrenet, 26 Ill.2d 224, 186 N.E.2d 306
(1962); People v. Embry, 20 Ill. 2d 331, 169 N.E.2d 767 (1960); People v. Mack, 12 IMl.
2d 151, 145 N.E.2d 609 (1957).
This view was further expanded by stating that where the narcotic is found on the
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
fornia ' extend this view by holding that such essential knowledge might
be inferred from the acts, declarations, or conduct of the defendant.
Virginia is in agreement with the majority view in that knowledge of the
character of the substance must be shown in order to convict the defendant
of illegal possession of marijuana." The court follows the expanded view
of Illinois by stating that Ritter's statements and the fact that the package
containing marijuana was found in his mailbox addressed to him implied
knowledge of such contraband material. 8 The principal case interprets the
Virginia statute' as requiring mere possession of marijuana combined with
the requisite knowledge of its existence, rather than inferring ownership to
be an essential element of the crime.2"
The Virginia legislature clearly manifests that in addition to Ritter, it
intends to insure against the possibility of absolute guilt in the future for
possession of marijuana by making it unlawful, under the newly enacted
Drug Control Act,' for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess
marijuana, except as expressly authorized by the act.
premises under the control of the defendant, this fact gives rise to an inference of
knowledge of possession by the defendant. See, People v. Robinson, 102 IlM. App. 2d 171,
243 N.E.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1968); People v. Galloway, 28 Ill. 2d 355, 192 N.E.2d 370
(1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964) People v. Nettles, 23 Ill. 2d 306, 178 N.E.2d
361 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 853 (1962).
10 See People v. Wilson, 268 Cal. App. 2d 581, 74 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
(defendant's knowledge of the narcotic was inferred from his answer that it was
grass when questioned about it); People v. Toms, 163 Cal. App. 2d 123, 329 P.2d
90 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (prior conduct such as previous convictions on narcotic
charges are admissable to show knowledge); People v. Flores, 155 Cal. App. 2d 347,
318 P.2d 65 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (presence of injecting equipment is sufficient to show
defendant's knowledge of the presence and character of the narcotics).
17 See cases cited note 12 supra.
18 Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 741-2, 173 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1970).
19 Ch. 451, §§ 1 (14), (19), [1952] Va. Acts of Assembly 737 (repealed 1970);
ch. 86, § 2 [19341 Va. Acts of Assembly 82 (repealed 1970); VA. CoD. ANN. § 54-
524.101 (c) (Cum. Supp. 1970).
20See Crisman v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 17, 87 S.E.2d 796 (1955). The court
held that where a small amount of heroin was found on the floor in front of the
back seat of a car, and all five occupants of the car denied possession of the
heroin, there could be no conviction because any of the five could have had
possession and there was no proof of ownership of the narcotic. Contra, People
v. Matthews, 18 Ill. 2d 164, 163 N.E.2d 469 (1959).
2 1 VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.101 (c) (Cum. Supp. 1970) provides in pertinent
part as follows:
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or itentionally [sic] to possess a
controlled drug unless such substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid
prescription or order from a practitioner, while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. Any
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The Ritter decision has been a step forward in prosecution for illegal
control of drugs. It has put Virginia in accord with the majority of juris-
dictions that allow convictions for illegal custody of drugs to be based on
constructive possession. However, both Ritter and the enactment of the new
legislative act22 have retained the safeguards against indiscriminate convic-
tions for possession of narcotic drugs by requiring knowledge of both the
presence and character of the drug.
W.T.H.
person convicted of a violation of this subsection with respect to a drug classified
in Schedule III or the controlled drug marijuana shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than one
thousand dollars or shall be confined in jail not exceeding twelve months, or
both ....
221d.
19711

